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Viewing cable 09BEIJING3313, UNDER SECRETARY BURNS MEETING WITH CCID DIRECTOR
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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|
09BEIJING3313 | 2009-12-11 10:10 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing |
VZCZCXRO3525
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #3313/01 3451022
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111022Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7177
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 003313
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2034
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC PGOV KN IR CH
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS MEETING WITH CCID DIRECTOR
WANG JIARUI ON IRAN, NORTH KOREA
Classified By: Political Minster Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4
(b/d).
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Under Secretary Burns met with Director of the Chinese
Communist Party's Central Committee International Liaison
Department (CCID) Wang Jiarui December 9 to discuss
U.S.-China cooperation on North Korea and Iran. Wang said
that the "ideal outcome" of Special Representative for North
Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth's current visit to Pyongyang
would be a meeting with DPRK leader Kim Jong-il. The very
fact of the visit, Wang emphasized, was important because it
sent a signal to the DPRK that the United States was serious
about negotiating a settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue.
The DPRK would be unwilling in the short run to publicly
announce denuclearization or an immediate return to the
Six-Party talks, but would not want to lose the opportunity
presented by Ambassador Bosworth's visit. The important
thing was to keep things moving in the right direction and
prevent the situation spinning out of control.
¶2. (C) Wang praised U.S. policy on Iran, calling it a
"practical" approach. He said China was in agreement with
the United States "in principle" that Iran should not be
allowed to acquire nuclear weapons and that the consequences
of such an event would have a negative impact on Chinese
interests. He also said that China would cooperate in
persuading Iran to live up to the commitments it made at the
October meeting in Geneva with the P5-plus-1 to resume
discussions on the nuclear issue and allow third countries to
reprocess its nuclear fuel. However, Wang insisted,
continued diplomacy, rather than military action or stronger
sanctions, was the best option at present. U/S Burns
stressed the importance of China's cooperation and would not
close the door on diplomacy but that U.S. patience was
wearing thin and Iran had to soon show it was complying with
international agreements or face real consequences. End
Summary.
China Pleased With Bosworth Visit to DPRK
-----------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Asked his views on the North Korea nuclear situation,
CCID Director Wang stated that China was very pleased that
Ambassador Bosworth was in Pyongyang, noting that the visit
would be "cost effective" because the North Koreans had made
clear there could be no resuming the Six-Party Talks without
first convening a bilateral U.S.-DPRK dialogue. Ambassador
Bosworth's visit effectively "kicked the ball" back to the
North Koreans. When asked what the likely outcome of the
talks would be, Wang said the ideal outcome would be a
meeting with Kim Jong-il, which would send a very positive
signal, but it was impossible to predict North Korean
behavior through "normal" means of reading public indicators.
Wang said that Ambassador Bosworth would likely meet with
First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju, who was "a
hardliner" with "strong views" and whose opinions were valued
by the DPRK's top leaders. However, Kang had to follow
orders from above, Wang noted, and would not want to lose
such an opportunity to improve relations with the United
States. The negotiations with Ambassador Bosworth would be a
bargaining process, with each side trying to discern the
other's bottom line.
¶4. (C) The North needed a breakthrough in its relations with
the United States, Wang asserted, both because of its
domestic situation and the current international environment,
but it would not be easy for North Korea to make a specific
promise regarding a return to the Six-Party Talks or to
announce denuclearization. Ambassador Bosworth's trip itself
was important because it demonstrated that the United States
was serious about preventing a nuclear Korean peninsula and
was committed to a peaceful resolution of the issue. Wang
said China was aware that the United States worried that it
would be deceived by the North but in China's view there was
no need to worry because the current process of promoting
dialogue and negotiations was quite transparent and the
international community would know what the outcome would be.
¶5. (C) Wang reiterated China's long-standing position that
the key objective at this stage was to prevent the situation
on the Korean peninsula from spinning out of control and to
establish a positive direction through dialogue and
negotiation. He said that Ambassador Bosworth should make
clear to North Korea that it was not in U.S. interests to
prolong the current state of hostility, that the United
States had no intention of promoting regime change in the
North, and that international sanctions and relations with
the DPRK's neighbors could be changed and they could help
BEIJING 00003313 002 OF 003
with North Korea's economic development. This was contingent
upon a change in North Korean behavior and an eventual North
Korean pledge to the world that it would not embark on the
road to nuclear weapons. U/S Burns responded that the United
States understood the complexity of the situation and
emphasized the great importance of joint U.S.-China and
Five-Party efforts to bring North Korea back as soon as
possible to the Six-Party Talks and its denuclearization
commitments.
Unified U.S.-China Effort Needed on Iran
----------------------------------------
¶6. (C) U/S Burns emphasized that the nuclear weapons
challenge in Iran required a similarly unified U.S.-China and
international effort. The United States was profoundly
concerned about Middle East stability, which was crucial to
both U.S. and Chinese security and economic interests. If
Iran continued developing a nuclear capability, Israel would
"no doubt" act, and concern among the Arab states might
trigger a regional arms race. President Obama had repeatedly
reached out to Iran's leaders, but had yet to receive a
positive response. Moreover, Iran had not followed through
on the understandings reached in Geneva in October, including
Iran's commitment to meet with the P5-plus-1 countries for
talks focused on the nuclear issue and its initial acceptance
of the IAEA's TRR proposal. The United States would continue
to take a diplomatic, creative and flexible approach working
with our Russian, Chinese and European partners, but time was
running short. By the end of the year, President Obama would
have to evaluate Iran's actions thus far. If Iran did not
live up to its agreements, the United States would work with
its international partners to make clear to Iran the
consequences of its unwillingness to engage seriously.
Wang Pledges Chinese Support...
-------------------------------
¶7. (C) Wang had high praise for U.S. efforts in the Middle
East in general and the approach to Iran in particular,
stating that China viewed U.S. measures in Iran as very
practical and as based on realities on the ground. China had
economic interests in Iran, but, in principle, China had no
differences with the United States on the nuclear weapons
issue. China agreed that Iranian nuclear weapons would bring
great instability to the Middle East, including possible
warfare, even on a global scale, with consequences far
greater than China's economic interests. China agreed with
the IAEA proposal and that Iran should live up to the
commitments it made in Geneva, but unfortunately, Iran had
not responded positively to this proposal despite many
efforts by the United States, China, and the international
community. China had consistently told Iran that China
strongly opposed Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. This
message, he claimed, has been conveyed in party-to-party and
government-to-government meetings and in "all channels."
However, Iran maintained it had no nuclear weapons and was
simply pursuing the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
...But Urges Continued Diplomacy
--------------------------------
¶8. (C) Wang pressed U/S Burns for details on when the limits
of U.S. patience might be exhausted and counseled further
efforts to find a diplomatic solution. Burns replied that
U.S. patience was nearly exhausted. Wang acknowledged that
there was a potential for an Israeli military strike were the
situation not handled properly, which was of grave concern to
China, but insisted that harsh actions were not yet
warranted. Recent U.S. experience with a military option, he
said, should teach some lessons, and the outcome of tougher
sanctions was also unpredictable. The United States needed
to understand that Iran was not Iraq, and the best way
forward was to continue to pursue peaceful dialogue and
negotiations and to carefully examine previous diplomatic
efforts to see what changes needed to be made.
North Korea and Iran Similarities
---------------------------------
¶9. (C) Wang also claimed similarities between the North Korea
and Iran nuclear issues. The solution in both cases was to
persist over the long haul, continuing intensive efforts with
the objective of ensuring that the situation did not spin out
of control. Wang noted that in his several recent visits to
Iran anti-American sentiment was strong, everywhere, and
palpable, which, he said, was not conducive to resolving the
issue.
¶10. (C) Wang asked U/S Burns for his views on who made final
decisions in Iran, President Ahmadinejad or Supreme Leader
BEIJING 00003313 003 OF 003
Khamenei. He said it would be very helpful to China if the
decision-making process in Iran could be sorted out. Wang
appeared to agree with the Under Secretary that Khamenei was
the final arbiter of Iranian policy and concluded by stating
that there might be a way for direct communication with the
Supreme Leader. He said direct engagement would avoid the
distortions of message that occurred when communicating
through an intermediary. Wang noted that there was not one
country in the international arena that supported Iran's
quest for nuclear weapons and emphasized that there was a
need for a unified international view on Iran.
¶11. (C) U/S Burns responded that the United States had made
very clear its willingness for direct diplomacy, but that it
took both sides to make direct communication work. He
emphasized that this was a core national security issue for
the United States, which could not abide greater Middle East
instability, and said the United States would continue its
diplomatic efforts in a creative and flexible manner.
However, he stated, at some point there had to be results and
U.S. patience was fast running out.
U.S.-China Cooperation
----------------------
¶12. (C) Wang said China would continue to make its own
efforts on the issue but China was willing to do more to
cooperate with the United States to facilitate a resolution
to the Iran nuclear problem. He welcomed further U.S.
suggestions on measures to achieve a breakthrough and asked
what the United States would like China to do or whether
there were areas in which China could make a contribution.
U/S Burns emphasized that the United States would like to
cooperate with China and needed to work closely with China to
find a way to persuade Iran to make the right choices. The
current focus was on persuading Iran to live up to the
commitments it made at the Geneva meetings on the TRR
proposal and by meeting again soon on the nuclear issue. The
two P5-plus-1 tracks -- diplomacy and sanctions -- were not
mutually exclusive. The United States had tried many
approaches to Iran in the past 11 weeks, and none had borne
fruit. The United States would not close the door on
diplomacy, but as in the case of putting pressure on North
Korea through UN Resolution 1874, we had to work together to
apply pressure to get Iran back to the diplomatic track.
Iran had to understand that it faced a clear choice. Iran
could choose to pursue the peaceful use of nuclear energy,
which the United States supported and would work to implement
if Iran demonstrated the exclusively peaceful nature of its
nuclear program. But Iran had to understand there were costs
to not following this path. Wang agreed that both sides
should try very hard to resolve the problem.
HUNTSMAN