

Date of Issue:
14 August 1992

REPORT NO: 013

[REDACTED]

3. SUBJECT:
OP BILLIARDS

Date of Information:
August 1992

4. SOURCE:

A former SVR Line X officer who served in London between 1972 and 1979 and in Paris from 1985 to 1992 who defected to the UK in 1992.

[REDACTED]

OP BILLIARDS

Recruitment

[redacted] was invited to a trade union meeting in Kingston sponsored by Andy WILSON a few years after he arrived in UK. PARELLIC was present. Neither WILSON nor anyone else played any part in talent spotting PARELLIC.

[redacted] invited PARELLIC to meet him alone. They discussed unemployment, trade union matters and social questions. They started meeting regularly once a month in restaurants. [redacted] treated these as covert meetings. He told PARELLIC not to speak about these meetings to others, but did not instruct him in covert measures in order not to frighten him off. PARELLIC told [redacted] about his life. He was disappointed about his lack of future in his employment. [redacted] encouraged PARELLIC to think that his life could be more adventurous. He also encouraged him to join a tennis club and gave him a racquet. For the first year [redacted] never broached the matter of his main interest; PARELLIC'S work in industrial technology. [redacted] felt it was too early to do so. [redacted] told PARELLIC that he was using the content of their discussions in his reports from the Embassy.

2. After a year [redacted] suggested that PARELLIC should get a better job and cut himself off from his CPGB activities. This took time as he was at first unwilling to break with his friends. Together they drew up a short list of companies, one of which was EMI. PARELLIC applied and EMI showed interest. The salary was lower than his current job, but [redacted] agreed to compensate him for this. [redacted] paid PARELLIC a significant sum (£1,000?) for joining EMI.

3. [redacted] also encouraged PARELLIC to get professional qualifications and improve his prospects. [redacted] and Moscow Centre did not expect PARELLIC to be successful because of his YCL background. PARELLIC'S landlord told him that the police had visited the house asking questions about his contacts. PARELLIC suspected that this was connected with security vetting.

4. PARELLIC was then assigned to the fuse project with Thorn/EMI. [redacted] made no demands on PARELLIC for information at first. Later [redacted] asked PARELLIC for information on the fuse. He intimated that he would be prepared to pay. At this time PARELLIC was having difficult relations with a girlfriend who was financially demanding. [redacted] used this as a lever but as their personal relations were so good it was not difficult for him to do so.

5. At first PARELLIC gave [redacted] a brief description of the fuse. [redacted] paid PARELLIC a small amount of money for this and asked him to find out about the security arrangements at EMI. He asked for information about the security staff, checks at the

gate and document security. He also asked whether it was possible to take a camera into the site. The impression received was that THORN EMI had a very lax security regime. Nevertheless [redacted] did not ask PARELLIC to take any documents out. At this stage Moscow Centre also asked for more checks on PARELLIC since it was unusual to gain such information from a former member of the CPGB.

6. [redacted] asked PARELLIC to memorise passages and diagrams from documents and reproduce them at home. He was then to photograph his notes, destroy them and give the film to [redacted]. The information was sent to Moscow Centre who replied to [redacted] that the fuse was old fashioned and of little interest. [redacted] could not recall which documents PARELLIC reproduced.

7. There were continuing suspicions about PARELLIC's reliability by Moscow Centre. On one occasion during a meeting [redacted] and PARELLIC were walking together in the grounds of Hampton Court when they came across Andy WILSON. WILSON expressed no surprise to see [redacted] and PARELLIC together. [redacted] had instructed PARELLIC to distance himself from the CPGB and the union in Kingston so he was concerned over this chance meeting. He asked PARELLIC whether there had been any reaction to this meeting, but PARELLIC said that he had heard of none.

Vienna Oral Lie Detector Test

8. Moscow Centre were concerned about the political repercussions of the case and whether PARELLIC was under British Control. The case was reported to ANDROPOV, then head of the KGB. It was decided to mount a sophisticated security check on PARELLIC which was the first of its kind. The check involved ten people in Austria. [redacted] suggested to PARELLIC that he travel to Austria in August with his girlfriend on the pretext of taking a holiday. [redacted] paid for the journey. [redacted] took no other part in the operation. The test took place in a rented house. One room was set aside for the test and one for the operators. A team patrolled the streets around the house in cars and on foot. The unit responsible for the operation was not from the FCD. One of the participants was Boris snu from the British desk in Directorate T and formerly en poste in London before [redacted]. PARELLIC passed the test, but some doubts still remained because of the unusual nature of the case, in particular PARELLIC's Communist background and the ease with which he penetrated EMI. Moscow Centre instructed [redacted] to tell PARELLIC to take copies of classified documents to Vienna. [redacted] objected to this unnecessary risk but was overruled. [redacted] believed that PARELLIC had copied the documents in EMI but could not be sure. He did not see the copied documents. The Centre was satisfied with the documents which were shown to ANDROPOV. [redacted] was not sure in which year the Vienna trip took place, but believed that PARELLIC was still working at EMI at the time.

SECRET

PARELLIC's Status

9. [REDACTED] did not have time to undertake the bureaucratic process of formalising PARELLIC as an agent. PARELLIC therefore remained a confidential contact while he was run by [REDACTED]

PARELLIC's Camera

10. [REDACTED] gave PARELLIC the money to buy a camera. This was a normal SLR model, either a Konica or a Canon. [REDACTED] instructed PARELLIC not to take the camera into EMI.

PARELLIC's Loss of Access

11. PARELLIC's loss of access to the fuse came as a great disappointment and puzzle. At about this time [REDACTED] noticed surveillance just before a meeting that he was unable to abort. [REDACTED] grabbed PARELLIC and took him to a nearby station where they took a train. PARELLIC said he had not noticed anything unusual, but [REDACTED] suspected that PARELLIC had come to attention.

Information Passed to [REDACTED] and Evaluation of PARELLIC

12. PARELLIC gave [REDACTED] about three films each with twenty four exposures or less of his notes from classified documents. [REDACTED] did not give PARELLIC any guidance on what to copy. Moscow Centre was not impressed with the information, which it said was of an older type of fuse. In [REDACTED]'s view the Centre wanted PARELLIC to bring the documents to Vienna in order that he make a visible commitment to them rather than because of the value of the documents. The case was judged at the time as a promising one for the future rather than a currently productive case.

13. After PARELLIC was transferred to EMI Medical he continued to pass information to [REDACTED]. He obtained twelve volumes of documents on a medical scanner. In this case he took original documents from the works as they were unclassified and it was easy to obtain official copies.

Handover to LAZIN

14. [REDACTED] introduced PARELLIC to LAZIN at a meeting. The handover was without incident.

15. While LAZIN ran the case a DLB in a telephone box was lost. The DLB contained a map with a route for PARELLIC to follow to a meeting. However the DLB was disturbed and pieces of paper thought to be the map were seen on the ground. It was concluded that children had found the DLB and destroyed the map. [REDACTED] heard about this while he was back in Moscow.

16. [REDACTED] did not think that PARELLIC provided anything of value while he was run by LAZIN. [REDACTED] heard some details of the case while he was in Moscow where he initially worked on the

British desk but he could not be sure that he had heard all the significant details.

17. After LAZIN was expelled contact was lost with PARELLIC. A A CHERNYAYEV (Line X, en poste 1979-83) made a reconnaissance to re-establish contact. He may have made a telephone call to PARELLIC. O P KRASAKOV Line X, en poste 1984-85 re-established contact by which time PARELLIC was working for GEC. PARELLIC then started to provide information of interest to Directorate T.

Current Situation

18. [redacted] thought that PARELLIC may still be in contact but there is a problem with the case, either PARELLIC is reluctant to continue or the case officer is unhappy. In support of this [redacted] said that when he was on leave in Moscow in June or July 1991 he was asked to visit the British desk in Directorate T to provide advice on the case, but [redacted] did not have the time to do so. In September 1991 [redacted] received a letter in Paris from Moscow asking him if he could organise a meeting with PARELLIC in France. [redacted] did not reply to the letter. He has heard nothing further about the case since.

A Warning to PARELLIC?

19. [redacted] thought that there would be no attempt to contact PARELLIC now that he had defected. The Centre would suspect a trap. Otherwise, the signal for danger would typically be a piece of paper (with no message) of a particular colour under the windscreen wiper of PARELLIC's car. There would be no procedure for PARELLIC to contact his case officer. It would be against all normal practice for the agent to be able to take this initiative.

Names Used by [redacted]

20. PARELLIC knows [redacted]'s surname. [redacted] gave him his card once. Andy WILSON could also have told PARELLIC [redacted]'s full name. [redacted] was known by the codename 'OZEROV' within the Service. This was used in UK, in the Centre and in France.

PARELLIC's Reaction to his Loss of Security Clearance

21. PARELLIC's actions to find out why he had lost his security clearance were agreed with [redacted]. There were a number of reasons for this course of action. It was better to know why he had lost his clearance. They also felt that he should press his rights in order to check whether there was a proper case against him. Psychologically it was better to be self assertive in the matter. The aim was for PARELLIC to regain his clearance.

SECRET

Motivation of PARELLIC

22. Ideological

Money

Opened new horizons/gave PARELLIC feeling of self importance.

Disappointment with leadership and corruption in the CPGB.

Talent Spotting by PARELLIC?

23. PARELLIC did not talent spot or help recruit anyone else. [redacted] asked him to talent spot other staff but he seemed reluctant or unable to do this. [redacted] did not press him as he did not think this was the most appropriate use of PARELLIC at this stage.

Meetings

24. [redacted] used to meet PARELLIC in parks and restaurants in the Kingston area. Initially [redacted] met PARELLIC near his home. Later [redacted] used the telephone box technique to provide counter surveillance on PARELLIC before the meeting. [redacted] would intercept PARELLIC on his walk before when he was satisfied that PARELLIC was not under surveillance. Meetings took place once a month, usually during the evening at the weekend. The next meeting was arranged at each meeting.

25. The signal for an emergency meeting was a piece of paper of a particular colour under the windscreen wiper of PARELLIC's car. On seeing this signal PARELLIC would go to a telephone box at a particular time when he would receive a call from [redacted]. [redacted] never had occasion to use an emergency signal with PARELLIC.

DLB

26. [redacted] only used DLBs in telephone boxes to give PARELLIC a route to a meeting.

Codeword

27. The codeword for PARELLIC was 'BORG'. [redacted] chose this because of his own interest in tennis.

Payment

28. The payment of £1,000(?) was in recognition of PARELLIC's success in getting employment with EMI and as an inducement to co-operate. This was a large amount of money but was sanctioned because the case was considered to have a great potential.

29. [REDACTED] did not give PARELLIC a regular payment at first. After the test in Vienna PARELLIC was put on a salary. [REDACTED] instructed PARELLIC not to put the money in his bank and to use it wisely for private purposes.

Training

30. [REDACTED] gave PARELLIC tradecraft training. [REDACTED] stressed that he should be cautious and be friendly with colleagues. [REDACTED] showed him ways of checking that his contacts were not in touch with the Security Service. He gave him training in anti-surveillance.

Equipment

31. Apart from the money to buy a camera, [REDACTED] gave PARELLIC no equipment. It was possible that PARELLIC was given equipment later on.

Secret Writing/Live Letter Boxes

32. [REDACTED] did not instruct PARELLIC in secret writing. He did show him how to make cryptic diary notes giving details of their next meeting. [REDACTED] did not give him any LLB addresses abroad.

Trips Abroad

33. As well as Vienna, [REDACTED] knew that PARELLIC went to the USA in 1976/77. This was before he entered EMI. [REDACTED] asked him to write a letter to his American girlfriend and ask for an invitation to visit. [REDACTED] paid for the trip, hoping that PARELLIC may make contacts for a future job there. Nothing came of this and all PARELLIC was able to give [REDACTED] afterwards was simple information concerning USA customs procedures. [REDACTED] also remembered that PARELLIC had visited Portugal. He was tasked to clear a DLB from an area prohibited to Russians. This was a loyalty test. This was before the security test in Austria. PARELLIC travelled under his own name.

PARELLIC's Wife

34. PARELLIC married soon after [REDACTED]'s departure from UK. [REDACTED] thinks that this was the same girl with whom PARELLIC had been having earlier problems. [REDACTED] is not certain that PARELLIC's wife was aware of PARELLIC's relationship with the Soviets but he thinks it likely. He considers PARELLIC's Wife (Pam) as having the stronger character and PARELLIC is therefore subordinate to her.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Date of Issue:

25 August 1992

[REDACTED] REPORT NO: 034

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. SUBJECT:

Date of Information:

PARELLIC - Operation BILLIARDS -
Further (Interim) Reporting

August 1992

4. SOURCE:

A former SVR Line X officer who served
in London between 1972 and 1979 and in
Paris from 1985 to 1992 who defected
to the UK in 1992.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET

PARELLIC - Operation BILLIARDS - Further (Interim) Reporting

[redacted] was given copies of the "Williams" letter (appendix 1a and b to the brief); PARELLIC's scribbled notes, possibly referring to contacting arrangements (appendices 2 to 5); and PARELLIC's prepared notes/reports found in the boot of his car (appendix 6 a to e); PARELLIC's maps of Downtown Chicago (1976) and Oporto (1977); and a map of the locations mentioned in the notes above. He studied them on his own for about an hour without comment or interruption from the debriefer, who then asked him for his interpretation and opinion of the papers. [redacted] was told by the debriefer that his unprompted comments were required and to this end the debriefer would, so far as possible, refrain from any comment or questioning of his own.

The "Williams" Letter

2. [redacted] said that this letter could have been sent to PARELLIC to call him to a meeting after interruption of contact. He noted that the handwriting was not that of a Britisher neither in the formulation of the characters nor in style. There were also some spelling mistakes. There was no address of sender on the letter nor on the envelope. The name "Williams" was not known to him. Source presumed from this letter that PARELLIC must have been given in advance some fixed contact arrangements so that he would know exactly what to do on receipt of such a letter.

3. Source was then asked whether he thought it risky to send such a letter to an agent's home address. He replied that it did, indeed, incur some degree of risk but it was a very practical way of re-establishing contact and it is a normal and accepted SVR Line X method of doing this. Other methods would include telephoning the agent or attempting to intercept him en route on his way to work. On reflection, Source was confident that this letter was an attempt to renew contact after a long interruption.

The Scribbled Notes

4. The Source stated that these represent pieces, written by PARELLIC himself, of a plan of contact arrangements with his Case Officer, using abbreviations in some instances. Source was then asked questions about each Appendix to the brief (nos 2 to 6e) and was then shown, at his request, the relevant "best guess" translations.

a) Appendix 2

- (i) Source did not, himself use tennis locations for intelligence meetings with PARELLIC. He used these only initially during the long period of

cultivation. He could see the possibility of such places now being used as they would offer a form of natural cover. He could not remember whether he had used Parliament Hill for a meeting - it is a possibility; but most of his meetings with PARELLIC took place in the Wembley and Kensington areas.

- (ii) The "Danger" and "Come Next Day" signals might well be used in conjunction with eg a card on a display or message board in a club or in a changing room. Such a signal could be put in a place regularly visited by PARELLIC and which could be visited by his Case Officer from the Residency. Such a site could be used for placing a signal to call or cancel a meeting or as a warning of danger.
- (iii) It was suggested to [redacted] that the Horsenden Hill entry could represent a meeting and fall back arrangements if contact was broken. He agreed with this interpretation.

b) Appendix 3

- (i) "Jan Apr every 4 months" looks like a constant contact arrangement in case of contact interruption, according to Source. Starting in January or April, for example, every 4 months, PARELLIC was to visit a fixed signal site or meeting place, in order to meet, for example, a new Case Officer unknown to him, in the event of his previous Case Officer having returned to the FSU without a handover or been declared png. The "Green? Line/Tone Go" and "Answer Michael" probably refers to a sign and form of words to act as a recognition signal. This kind of arrangement would be made if the pattern of regular meetings was broken. For example, if the Case Officer had come under surveillance for two or three successive, regular, fall back and possibly emergency meetings in succession, or if the agent was ill or otherwise unable to get to the regular meetings, then reliance would be placed on the constant fall-back arrangement every fourth month, mentioned above. PARELLIC would be expected to appear at these meetings, on the first Saturday of every fourth month (Source's interpretation) until such time as a successful meeting occurred.
- (ii) Source did not know how to interpret 4/15,22. If these were dates, neither the 13th nor the 22nd could be the first Saturday in any month.

- (iii) Source thought that the word "Standard", could represent a lamp standard or pillar at which, perhaps, PARELLIC should pause on an Anti-Surveillance route.
- (iv) The IQA Journal meant nothing to Source.
- (v) The bottom half of the note at Appendix 3 represented more contact arrangements showing a change in the pattern. The note probably indicates a new recognition phrase to do with "plants of common interest" and signal (ie PARELLIC should carry a copy of the "Guardian" newspaper), and new schedule constant meetings to take place in 'Homebase', with the Reserve and Fall-back meetings in 'Bejam'. These constant meetings appear to be organised for noon, still on the first Saturday of each month, possibly starting the route in Gloucester Road.

c) Appendix 4

- (i) Source does not recall having used South Harrow (station) himself, as a meeting place with PARELLIC, but he noted that the area is not far from Wembley - one of the areas he used for this purpose.

- (ii) Sudbury Town Triangle

At this point Source noticed that Sudbury Town is in a triangle of roads. If this triangle contains parkland and telephone boxes (referred to in his discussion with [REDACTED]), it could be a contact area he had used with PARELLIC.

- (iii) "When finished" etc could be a note for the next meeting more in the form of a question for PARELLIC to ask his Case Officer rather than a Case Officer's instruction.

d) Appendix 5

- (i) Karl GEHRING could have been talent-spotted by PARELLIC. Source asked PARELLIC to talent spot when he was the Case Officer, but PARELLIC was not particularly willing to undertake this work and never came up with any suggestions. "Get Karl's address" and "get old project notes" could refer to tasks set by the case officer.

- (ii) By this time, Source took it for granted that these notes and signs were to do with meetings and signals.

- (iii) In answer to a comment about the proximity of the junction of Abbotsbury and Melbury Roads to the Soviet Embassy, Source replied that such a site would be chosen typically as an emergency signal site. One way of using it would be for the agent to place the signal [eg if he wished to deliver (orally or physically) some urgent and important intelligence; or if he was in danger]. Another would be for the Case Officer to use it to invite an important agent to the nearest possible secure point to the Embassy for a meeting if, for any reason, the Case Officer was unable to travel further afield, or for a new Case Officer to request a meeting for the first time, after the departure or expulsion of the previous case officer without a handover. The former use is the more likely and would be quite normal in a country such as the UK or USA where the operating conditions for the conduct of clandestine intelligence activity are very difficult because of heavy surveillance. In such circumstances, the signal site typically would be at a point which the Case officer passes on foot, or in his car, every day on his way to work, so that surveillance teams would not notice the signal being read. Alternatively, this type of emergency signal site could be given to an agent as a form of assurance of psychological prop and rarely used.
- (iv) Source thought that "Long Break" could conceivably refer to an extended lunch hour meeting.

5. The Scientific Papers

a) Appendix 6a

Any intelligence, such as this paper, on, or touching on, the subject of SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) is of top priority to the KGB/SVR Directorate T.

b) Appendices 6b to 6e

Source did not think that the Directorate T Requirements List mentioned any of these subjects specifically, but they would certainly be of interest to the Directorate and would be classified as "Initiative" reports ie reports on subjects thought by the agent and/or Case Officer as of possible interest and submitted to directorate T in precis form for comment.

c) General Remarks on Appendix 6

Source noted that all these papers were prepared in

capital letters in the same manner as when he was the Case Officer. The normal procedure would be for PARELLIC to photograph or photocopy them for his Case Officer and then destroy his original notes. From this he surmised that these papers had been prepared for PARELLIC's Case Officer but not yet handed over.

6. The Money

a) The £1000 Initial Payment

It was put to Source that he had changed his mind on the size of the initial payment made to PARELLIC from £10,000 to £1,000. Source agreed and said he had thought about the matter and reached the conclusion, for the following reasons, that the sum had been £1,000:

- (i) The sum had intentionally been a substantial one in order to try to ensure PARELLIC's co-operation. At the time £1,000 would have represented about 25% of PARELLIC's annual salary and this sum would have been about the right size. £10,000, on the other hand, would have been excessive and it is unlikely that Centre would have approved the payment of such a large sum at such an early (and unproven) stage in PARELLIC's intelligence career.
- (ii) Source also deemed it possible he had thought of the figure £10,000, because he was so used to thinking in terms of French Francs. This number of Francs would, of course, roughly equate to £1,000.

b) The £2,000 Paid in £50 Notes

Commenting on the £2,000 paid in notes, some of which had come from the USA, Source stated that this cash could well have been obtained from a branch of an American Bank in the UK, if PARELLIC or the security officer in the London Residency had gone there to exchange dollars for pounds sterling. Sometimes agents were paid in American dollars (in France and many other countries such an arrangement is the norm), but Source thought it fairly unlikely, on balance, that an agent in the UK would have been paid in currency other than Sterling. Nevertheless, these Sterling notes could have been obtained by the Residency in exchange for dollars.

The Trip to the USA (1976)

7. Source was shown the marked map of Downtown Chicago and asked for his comments. He replied that this trip had no intelligence significance in terms of meetings, signals and

tradedcraft etc nor was the local Residency informed of the trip. PARELLIC was sent on the trip, paid for by the KGB, to establish contacts and friends and to reconnoitre the possibilities of obtaining a job out there. It had been the KGB's intention to transfer PARELLIC from the UK to the USA to work against "The Main Target". In the event, these plans failed. Source thought that the ringed buildings and numbers might, therefore, represent universities, research establishments or contact addresses. They would not have been telephone kiosks, or meeting places or DLBs.

The Trip to Portugal (1977)

8. Source was shown the marked map of Oporto and asked for his comments. In this case, the trip was for more obvious intelligence reasons -

- a) To find out if PARELLIC was reliable and "clean" (ie not a double agent);
- b) To test his commitment as an agent.

The Local Residency was informed in advance of the trip and asked, via Centre, to make impersonal contact with PARELLIC, (via DLB if Source could remember correctly, but it could have been by telephone) to give him detailed instructions to follow a certain route, and fill or empty a DLB. Source did not think that he gave PARELLIC the map. He thought it probably had been provided locally. The Local Residency was to provide officers to keep PARELLIC under surveillance throughout this route. Source thought that the "crosses" might represent telephone kiosks or potential DLB sites. Whilst Source had given general instructions to PARELLIC in London, Source had not been privy to the actual details of the test route. When told that the crosses were telephone kiosks, Source thought this entirely consistent with the aims of the exercise.

Desk Comment: The rest of the brief, particularly the "Harry" story, will be put to Source on 27 August 1992.

SECRET

Date of Issue:

1 September 1992

NO: 046

3. SUBJECT:

Date of Information:

[REDACTED]'s Contemporaries in London - August 1992
Viktor LAZIN

4. SOURCE:

A former SVR Line X officer who served in London between 1972 and 1979 and in Paris from 1985 to 1992 who defected to the UK in 1992.

[REDACTED] REPORT 046

[REDACTED]'s Contemporaries in London - Viktor Nikolayevich LAZIN

When Source left the UK in 1979, LAZIN took over as Head of Line X. He ran the agent "BORG": [REDACTED]

2. Source thought that LAZIN, like most of his colleagues at the time, was "full of noise" and not much intelligence action. They were more keen on shopping for Western goods and lining their own pockets.

Date of Issue:
1 September 1992

REPORT NO: 049

[REDACTED]

3. SUBJECT:

PARELLIC - Operation BILLIARDS -
Further Reporting

Date of Information:
August 1992

4. SOURCE:

A former SVR Line X officer who served
in London between 1972 and 1979 and in
Paris from 1985 to 1992 who defected
to the UK in 1992.

[REDACTED]

REPORT 049

PARELLIC - Operation BILLIARDS - Further Reporting

Further to [REDACTED] Report 034, Source was given details of the "Harry" story, and of the £12,000 payment over the last two years and was asked for his comments.

2. Source expressed surprise at the £12,000 payment since February 1990, in view of the altered circumstances within the KGB/SVR over that period. The essence of the situation at Centre is that, over the last two years there has been no organised demand for intelligence from Government Departments or Industry, particularly following the demise of the VPK, and mounds of documentary intelligence has been piling up waiting for a customer. Neither is there any proper Direction from Centre, nor money to pay agents. In Paris, the instructions from Centre, over the last year, were to try to hold on to the agents they had, but to carry on so far as possible without paying them. Against this background, the payment of £12,000 over the last two years seemed substantial and indicative that PARELLIC must have produced worthwhile information, or perhaps been the only major case left to run.

3. Referring to the "Harry" story, Source considered that "Harry" might well be the alias used by PARELLIC's Case Officer. When Source was running the case he used the alias "Simon", when telephoning the agent. Each successive Case Officer, he thought, would choose his own alias - therefore the alias used could change several times over the course of an agent's career.

4. When given the description of "Harry" up to but short of the flecked grey suite, Source smiled and said "BOZHANOV". Alternatively, "Harry" could be an Englishman, if the Case Officer had decided to run PARELLIC via a Head Agent. In today's climate, when officers are seeking unorthodox ways of running agents, this method would be considered as a possibility.

5. A Head Agent role might be given, for instance, to a proven, trustworthy agent who had lost access in his original field of operation. Source doubted however, that the UK Station had a sufficient number of agents to spare one as a Head Agent. In the 1970s Line X in the UK had about 5 agents at any one time. The advantages of using a Head Agent of non-FSU nationality would include the dissociation of the agent from the Embassy/RTD and unlimited and unfettered travel by the Head Agent abroad (eg Helsinki) for Third Country meetings.

6. On this evidence, Source thought it was not possible to decide that any part of the "Harry" story was untrue.

Date of Issue:

17 September 1992

REPORT NO: 063

[REDACTED]

Date of Information:

September 1992

3. SUBJECT:

BILLIARDS - KGB Consideration of PARELLIC's CPGB Association in his Recruitment

4. SOURCE:

A former SVR Line X officer who served in London between 1972 and 1979 and in Paris from 1985 to 1992 who defected to the UK in 1992.

[REDACTED]

REPORT 063


BILLIARDS - KGB Consideration of PARELLIC's CPGB Associations in his Recruitment

PARELLIC was a member of the Young Communist League (YCL) when [redacted] first met him. This was regarded by Centre and [redacted] both as an advantage and disadvantage: an advantage in that PARELLIC was politically sympathetic, reliable, loyal and well motivated; a disadvantage in that he was unlikely ever to obtain access to classified information.

Desk Comment:

It is, of course, well known from RIS MO that information does not have to be classified to be of considerable use to the RIS. This was clearly an overriding consideration in PARELLIC's case.

2. These considerations, however, no longer apply. Because, in the SVR's experience, most members of foreign Communist Parties (CPs) blame the current and recent FSU leadership for the demise of Communism, it is dangerous for SVR Intelligence officers to attempt to have any kind of operational relationship with such people.



[REDACTED]
Date of Issue:

23 September 1992

[REDACTED] REPORT NO: 089

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. SUBJECT:

Date of Information:

September 1992

[REDACTED]

4. SOURCE:

A former SVR Line X officer who served in London between 1972 and 1979 and in Paris from 1985 to 1992 who defected to the UK in 1992.

[REDACTED]

Date of Issue:
2 October 1992

REPORT NO: 102

[REDACTED]

3. SUBJECT:

The BILLIARDS/PARELLIC Case -
Follow-up Reporting

Date of Information:
September 1992

4. SOURCE:

A former SVR Line X officer who served
in London between 1972 and 1979 and in
Paris from 1985 to 1992 who defected
to the UK in 1992.

[REDACTED]

Vo [REDACTED] REPORT 102

The BILLIARDS/PARELLIC Case - Follow-up Reporting

don't have

Vo Previous [REDACTED] reports 013, 034, 049 and 063 refer.

2. Source was asked about any meetings he had with PARELLIC at the Associated Union of Engineering Workers (AEUW) Kingston Branch premises, and CPGB or YCL functions.

3. At Source's first meeting with PARELLIC at the AEUW Kingston Branch he did arrange to meet him the next time, a short while later, in private away from these premises. Indeed, after this first meeting, Source never met PARELLIC again on AEUW premises. Neither did Source ever meet PARELLIC at any CPGB or YCL functions. However, Source did later attend, at Andy WILSON's invitation, a social evening and dance in a large hall in Kingston, organised by the AEUW. This was just a social event attended by a wide range of AEUW members and their families and had no intelligence significance. He certainly did not see the event as cover for a meeting with PARELLIC.

4. The only other Soviet official, in Sources knowledge, to visit the Kingston branch of AEUW was Viktor Ivanovich MOKHNACHEV, the Embassy official responsible for contact/liaison with the Trade Union Movement, who was not an Intelligence Officer.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Date of Issue:
26 October 1992

[REDACTED] REPORT NO: 122

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. SUBJECT:

Date of Information:

BILLIARDS Case - LAZIN's Tradecraft
with PARELLIC

October 1992

4. SOURCE:

A former SVR Line X officer who served
in London between 1972 and 1979 and in
Paris from 1985 to 1992 who defected
to the UK in 1992.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

BILLIARDS Case - LAZIN's Tradecraft with PARELLIC

Further to [redacted] Report 046, Source was asked whether LAZIN's tradecraft, when he took over PARELLIC/BORG from Source, followed a similar pattern as before.

2. SOURCE confirmed that it would have been very similar, as LAZIN had read BORG's file thoroughly and Source tried to transfer his own techniques to LAZIN, and introduced the latter personally to BORG at the handover.

3. Source adds that LAZIN drank heavily.

Date of Issue:
30 October 1992

REPORT NO: 124

[REDACTED]

3. SUBJECT:

Date of Information:
October 1992

[REDACTED]

4. SOURCE:

A former SVR Line X officer who served in London between 1972 and 1979 and in Paris from 1985 to 1992 who defected to the UK in 1992.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Date of Issue:

13 November 1992

[REDACTED] REPORT NO: 136

3. SUBJECT:

Operation BILLIARDS: Further Reporting

Date of Information:

November 1992

4. SOURCE:

A former SVR Line X officer who served in London between 1972 and 1979 and in Paris from 1985 to 1992 who defected to the UK in 1992.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] REPORT 136

Operation BILLIARDS: Further Reporting

Source explained that he identified SMITH as having intelligence potential through a combination of his physical attributes, his character and his left wing views. Source considered that SMITH could be easily influenced because, whilst he was well educated at Surrey university, he was still young and dissatisfied with his lack of professional progress. When they first met Source intentionally did not speak to SMITH too long, but they arranged to meet privately. However he did not think that SMITH was a volunteer in the intelligence sense.

2. Source continued that he was unsure of SMITH at the start of their relationship. However the KGB in UK had felt under pressure since the expulsions of 1971 so Source did not have many other cases. He therefore looked upon SMITH as a useful training exercise, even if he did not develop into a fully recruited agent. Whilst he was cultivating SMITH, Source did not ask any leading questions for about a year. Money was not a leading factor in SMITH's recruitment. Initially Source only paid for meals. He did remember giving SMITH a tennis racquet as a gift and advising him to join a tennis club. This was to give SMITH a greater social standing in the community. He never personally played tennis with SMITH. At the beginning of the relationship, Source thought that SMITH may have had potential as a political agent. Recruitment in this area was less dangerous operationally. However, SMITH lacked the personality and ambition in the political field, so Source then directed him into the S & T area.

3. Source commented that when they initially spoke SMITH had appeared disenchanted with the CPGB and TU activists. However he was not keen to immediately give up his friends when Source requested that he do so. Source only met SMITH once a month, so it took some time to convince him to drop his CPGB friends. Source commented that SMITH had a sensitive personality which had attracted him to Source.

[REDACTED]


4. Turning to the money payments to SMITH, Source could not remember when these precisely began. He could not remember the denominations of the cash he passed to SMITH. He stated that such cash payments were in 'clean' money purchased in other parts of the world and provided by the Centre. Case officers were aware of the danger of leaving their finger prints on the money. Normally only the cashier, a woman, in the Embassy handled the money itself. However the case officer obviously had to touch the envelope in order to pass the cash to the agent.

Operation BILLIARDS: Further Reporting

Source explained that he identified SMITH as having intelligence potential through a combination of his physical attributes, his character and his left wing views. Source considered that SMITH could be easily influenced because, whilst he was well educated at Surrey university, he was still young and dissatisfied with his lack of professional progress. When they first met Source intentionally did not speak to SMITH too long, but they arranged to meet privately. However he did not think that SMITH was a volunteer in the intelligence sense.

2. Source continued that he was unsure of SMITH at the start of their relationship. However the KGB in UK had felt under pressure since the expulsions of 1971 so Source did not have many other cases. He therefore looked upon SMITH as a useful training exercise, even if he did not develop into a fully recruited agent. Whilst he was cultivating SMITH, Source did not ask any leading questions for about a year. Money was not a leading factor in SMITH's recruitment. Initially Source only paid for meals. He did remember giving SMITH a tennis racquet as a gift and advising him to join a tennis club. This was to give SMITH a greater social standing in the community. He never personally played tennis with SMITH. At the beginning of the relationship, Source thought that SMITH may have had potential as a political agent. Recruitment in this area was less dangerous operationally. However, SMITH lacked the personality and ambition in the political field, so Source then directed him into the S & T area.

3. Source commented that when they initially spoke SMITH had appeared disenchanted with the CPGB and TU activists. However he was not keen to immediately give up his friends when Source requested that he do so. Source only met SMITH once a month, so it took some time to convince him to drop his CPGB friends. Source commented that SMITH had a sensitive personality which had attracted him to Source.




4. Turning to the money payments to SMITH, Source could not remember when these precisely began. He could not remember the denominations of the cash he passed to SMITH. He stated that such cash payments were in 'clean' money purchased in other parts of the world and provided by the Centre. Case officers were aware of the danger of leaving their finger prints on the money. Normally only the cashier, a woman, in the Embassy handled the money itself. However the case officer obviously had to touch the envelope in order to pass the cash to the agent.

2nd page
Report No. 136

SL

5. Source restated that SMITH only produced a maximum 3 rolls of film during his time at Thorn/EMI. The Soviets had been surprised at the ease with which he gained access to a sensitive project. This meant that the Centre was initially sceptical of the information he produced. At the beginning there was a lot of concern that SMITH may have been a DA being run against them. These doubts continued throughout the period Source ran SMITH and with subsequent case officers.



7. Source was unsure whether SMITH could make a good agent when he joined Thorn/EMI. He paid him £1000 to cushion SMITH's transition into becoming an active agent. Source was very cautious throughout the cultivation. He never pushed SMITH despite the fact that the Resident was keen to develop SMITH as a political agent. However SMITH was not ambitious enough to fulfil the role. He did not have the drive of [redacted]. Turning to operational details, Source remembered that occasionally he did ring SMITH at his home, but never from the Embassy. However, he clearly stated that he never rang SMITH at his work place. Normally the phone call was a simple coded message which resulted in SMITH going to a local phone box to accept a second call from the Source. Source commented that waiting for phone calls at a public phone box was good natural cover in the UK. Source stated that on several meetings he had used other KGB officers from the Embassy for counter-surveillance duties, but generally he preferred to meet agents alone. The one aspect where other officers were useful were as decoys to flood the OPs with sightings, behind which Source could safely leave and move to the meet without attracting surveillance. However he did not remember using this tactic in the SMITH case since it needed the Resident's permission.



8. Source stated that he had not instructed SMITH to obtain a second passport. He remembered that SMITH's marriage was not popular with the Centre since they were still not convinced of

SMITH's loyalty. They believed the marriage would lead to complications, especially since Pam SMITH was not a Communist. Source instructed SMITH not to tell his wife of his espionage since she could hold that against him if their marriage collapsed later.

9. When SMITH's vetting status was reduced, Source and SMITH closely analyzed the whole case. Source was extremely wary and reported his doubts to the Centre. He commented that the Centre always took the opposite view to the case officer in the field. Originally the Centre had been extremely suspicious of SMITH. Now, at this stage, they were keen to retain SMITH's services and ordered Source to keep in contact. When they discussed the situation Source and SMITH decided that SMITH's drop in access was due to his CPGB background coming to the authorities' attention. They decided that offence was the best form of defence, so SMITH began his prolonged campaign to regain his vetting status. Throughout their relationship the Centre were reluctant to pay SMITH a large salary.

10. Source was very complimentary of the surveillance cover to which he was subjected during his time in UK. He recalled

[REDACTED] recognising various surveillance personnel following him. On one occasion he was committed to meeting SMITH and the DLB was already in place when Source realised that he was under surveillance. He had to go ahead with the meeting, but had quickly moved SMITH to a railway station and onto a train to try to throw off surveillance. He took a film from SMITH and left that in a temporary DLB. He had not told SMITH of this for fear of alarming him, but Source had been seriously concerned.

11. Source was then questioned about SMITH's trips abroad. He remembered that the visit to the USA was before SMITH joined EMI. The Soviets paid for the trip in the hope that SMITH would secure a good job in the US S & T industry. He could then build his future access from this base. Source had therefore encouraged SMITH to write to an American girl he had previously been friendly with in order to arrange the visit. There was no contact between SMITH and the KGB in the USA. Whilst SMITH had failed to find a job, it had been a useful preliminary training exercise. SMITH had been tasked to visit some universities, including MIT, during his visit. These were chosen by Centre.

12. Source was less clear over SMITH's visits to Portugal. Source had suggested that it would be a useful training exercise for SMITH, as well as a way of proving his loyalty. The Centre had agreed to the visit and recommended Portugal because of its easy operating environment. The visit to Portugal was not SMITH's idea. Source remembered briefing SMITH before the visit but could not remember whether he instructed SMITH to clear a DLB or go to a telephone box. He recalled that these were somewhere outside Lisbon, but did not mention Oporto specifically. Portugal was often used by the KGB to test potential agents' reliability in this way. The fact that SMITH was going to Portugal with a friend would not have deterred the KGB from

arranging the test exercise. Source did not give SMITH a map of Oporto. He recalled that this visit was at an advanced stage of their relationship since the Centre's permission was needed to use Portugal. It was more likely to have been a year rather than 2 years, before SMITH visited Austria. Source did not know that SMITH was a keen flamenco fan.

13. Turning to the Austria trip, Source remembered that he was ordered by the Centre to instruct SMITH to bring photocopies or original documents to Vienna. Source never saw these documents. The Centre wanted to test SMITH's loyalty by demanding high level documents, rather than handwritten notes. Source had been concerned over the risks that this demand forced upon SMITH, but had been overruled. SMITH was instructed to visit either a flat or the Soviet Embassy in Vienna where he was taken by car to another address. There he was questioned by a special team from a KGB laboratory. They put SMITH through a series of prepared questions. This was the first overseas use of a new Soviet non-contact lie detector technique. Permission was granted at the highest level before it could take place. SMITH was unaware that he was being assessed and passed the loyalty test. SMITH was paid for taking the documents to Vienna.

14. Source was questioned over the SMITH case once he had left the UK. He stated that he had heard by telegram of LAZIN's DLB operation with SMITH being disturbed by children whilst he was in the British department in Moscow Centre. When asked about SMITH's attitude when Source went home, Source remarked that he was more upset than SMITH. He remarked that LAZIN was a poor operational officer and that LAZIN and CHERNAYEV were close friends. CHERNAYEV believed that SMITH was a DA. This could account for SMITH being put 'on ice' between 1985-90, although the defection of ██████████ would have also had a serious effect on the case. The Centre regarded the issue of Source's visa for France as proof that SMITH was not a DA. Source thought that he had been asked to visit the British department in Moscow during his summer leave 1991 to discuss the SMITH case. He anticipated that they wished to invite SMITH to France to assess his usefulness at that time. He was aware that SMITH was not an efficient agent at this stage. Source had not had the time to visit the British Department during his leave. However, the request was repeated unofficially in the Autumn 1991 when Source was back in Paris. Source had ignored this request.

15. Source then considered the WILLIAMS letter. He commented that it could have been written in the Residency or in the Centre. The letter may have been written by an officer with whose handwriting SMITH was already familiar in order to prove its authenticity. He stated that the use of such a letter to re-establish contact with a former agent was not surprising. Source agreed that 3 month intervals between meetings indicated that SMITH was not passing over high grade intelligence to the Residency. Source was then asked for his opinion of BOZHANOV. This was extremely unflattering. Source regarded him as a second rate operator who was also a close friend of LAZIN. He again commented that LAZIN was a drunk and a womaniser. Source only

OLEG
GOLDIEVSKY

knew DEMCHENKO's name. He commented that he was a Line X officer, but he did not know him personally.

16. Source then commented on the training he had given SMITH. Regarding the cryptic notes in SMITH's diary to signify planned meetings, Source explained that these were a simple system. He could not remember the detail, but it was something like a sentence on one day would mean a meeting so many days after that. Source gave SMITH limited anti-surveillance training, but pointed out that if an agent uses too much tradecraft, then it could confirm to any counter espionage organisation watching that he is suspicious. It was up to the case officer to detect and defeat surveillance. Source could not remember giving SMITH any training about marks on walls or danger signs. When asked if an agent could get in touch with his case officer. Source explained that such an arrangement would be rare. The case officer would want to retain the initiative. Source did not think that SMITH was a sufficiently important agent to have been controlled by radio. This was an expensive tactic and only used for those important agents whose information is operationally time-related. This may be the case for a military or political agent, but was less likely for an S & T agent. Source commented that he personally never used church notice boards for leaving signals for his agents. Source did not remember using the Elstree district as a meeting place with SMITH. There was no set format for passing the meeting information to SMITH on the telephone.

17. Source stated that he advised SMITH not to put his cash payments into the Bank. He was not surprised that SMITH had received around £20,000 between 1990-92. He did not think that this sum was related to the importance of the information SMITH had provided the Soviets. This could reflect the Residency's low number of agents in UK and the fact that it was better to spend the budget, rather than not do so and so lose it next year.

18. Source explained that SMITH had not talent spotted anyone else. They had briefly discussed SMITH's colleagues to see whether they presented any threat, but SMITH had always failed to pass any other potential recruits to Source. Source had never pushed him in this matter.

19. Source concluded by stressing the psychological pressure of operating covertly in the UK. ~~_____~~ He stated that the feeling of surveillance everywhere prevented many KGB officers from operating well. Some of those that did, operated in such an unprofessional manner that their agents were compromised. To some case officers this came as a relief since it meant they could cease operating clandestinely altogether.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Date of Issue:

10 November 1992

[REDACTED] REPORT NO: 137

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. SUBJECT:

Date of Information:

BILLIARDS - The Radar Fuse
Information

November 1992

4. SOURCE:

A former SVR Line X officer who served
in London between 1972 and 1979 and in
Paris from 1985 to 1992 who defected
to the UK in 1992.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET

BILLIARDS - The Radar Fuse Information

Source was asked to go back over the circumstances that led to Michael J SMITH passing on to the KGB the information about the radar fuse XN715.

2. After SMITH had been with THORN EMI (joined July 1976) for a few months, Source directed SMITH to seek out information that, in effect, would earn him large sums of money. Up until this time SMITH had reported only on local political and trade union activity of only marginal interest to the KGB.

3. When SMITH described the information (on the fuse) to which he had acquired access, he was clearly frightened of the possible consequences of passing classified material on to the KGB. Source knew that SMITH had been subjected to some form of security vetting before he acquired the access, which fact had alarmed the Centre as had, subsequently, the news that SMITH could acquire information on the radar fuse. Source was elated about the nuclear weapons connection, however, as was the KGB Resident. Source had accordingly taken it on himself to give money to SMITH for the information, without the authority of the Centre but with the support of the Resident.

4. The actual information was delivered to Source in three films, each containing about 12 exposed frames. The system Source had agreed with SMITH was that the latter would memorise a document or diagram and on returning home write down as much of it as he could recall. He would repeat the process over and over until he was able to write out a nearly perfect version of the document or diagram, which he would then photograph. Never, to Source's knowledge, did SMITH remove an original document or photocopy to photograph at home; all his intelligence product was handwritten and then photographed. The handwritten notes were then destroyed.

5. The Centre took months to respond to the contents of the first film and when they did it was to express reservations about the ease with which SMITH, a known CP member, had gained access to classified information and to advise Source to proceed slowly and with great caution. Initial technical comment was that the material, notably an aerial system depicted in diagrammatic form, related to an old American fuse. The Centre could not believe that the British were then working on something so out-of-date. A comment was made that the information looked like something out of the "New Scientist" magazine. There was suspicion in the Centre that something was wrong, for example that SMITH was under Security Service control and passing the KGB "chicken-feed". The Centre was in any case always sceptical about breaking new ground, not least because all too often the optimism of KGB officers failed to live up to expectations.

6. Source said that the films SMITH exposed and passed on were developed in the Residency before onward transmission to the Centre. Source could only evaluate the material at a non-expert level but to him it had looked good.

7. Source was astonished to hear that SMITH had lost his access to classified information in May 1978, fifteen months before the testing 10 day visit to Vienna (August 1979). He averred that had SMITH told him of the loss of access he would have reported the matter at once to the Centre, and the Vienna meeting would never have happened. When, after Vienna, Source had been told by SMITH of his loss of access he had passed this information on to the Centre at once. At the time he had been greatly alarmed, perceiving the "handwriting" of counter-espionage.

8. Strangely the reaction of the Centre to the news was not as extreme as Source had expected, possibly because it was felt that accountability might extend to the hierarchy. Personally Source was happy that no criticism came his way.

Desk Comment: Source left the UK in September 1979. Presumably, therefore, he was told by SMITH of his loss of access after the latter's return from Vienna and before Source left the UK, because Source had agreed with SMITH a plan of action to determine from the authorities why he had lost his security clearance. (See [redacted] Report 013.)

9. Source never knew what documents (probably photocopies because Source felt certain he would have counselled against taking original documents) SMITH had taken to Vienna, but believed that for credibility's sake they must have related to the fuse. He had been against the idea in principle because of the security risks of travelling with classified material (original or photocopy), but Centre had been "desperately in doubt" and wanted something tangible. They did not want further handwritten material. Later Source had met STALNOV who had been in Vienna with SMITH. STALNOV had not given the impression that the documents produced by SMITH had been of great value but neither had he dismissed them. On the oral lie-detector test itself Source recalled that the reaction to SMITH's performance had been good: "not 100%, but over 50%". SMITH had not been confirmed as an agent in Source's time in UK and had not been listed as an achievement to Source's credit.

10. Asked about other information obtained by SMITH from Thorn/EMI, Source said that it comprised only a number of leaflets and prospectuses.

11. Source considered it possible that SMITH delivered his later instalment of fuse material after he had lost his access, possibly to maintain the payments.

Desk Comment: [redacted]

[REDACTED]

General Desk Comment: To reiterate, SMITH went to Vienna in August 1979 and Source left the UK in September 1979. In between, SMITH allegedly declared his loss of access to Source, and received advice to be self-assertive in pressing for an explanation about the loss of his security clearance. Also in this short period SMITH allegedly continued to pass information (unclassified) from EMI Medical to Source [REDACTED] Report 013, paragraph 13).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Date of Issue:
10 November 1992

[REDACTED] REPORT NO: 147

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. SUBJECT:

Date of Information:

BILLIARDS - Extent of Material on the November 1992
XN715 Fuse Compromised to the KGB

4. SOURCE:

A former SVR Line X officer who served
in London between 1972 and 1979 and in
Paris from 1985 to 1992 who defected
to the UK in 1992.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] REPORT 147


BILLIARDS - Extent of Material on the XN715 Fuse Compromised to the KGB

Source confirmed that from his recollection the information he passed back to the Centre was reasonably detailed, and included key parameters (frequencies, functional block diagram etc, details of the antenna, and possibly coding). It enabled him to understand at the time the principles of operation of the equipment, although now he could no longer recall all the technical details. Information was passed on piecemeal over a period of several months, sufficient to allow the Centre to raise supplementary requests for information if they wished to do so. In addition, Source made a specially arranged visit to Vienna at which an unknown but possibly substantial amount of additional information was handed over, but Source could provide no information on this.

2. When questioned on the extent of the follow-up requests for information and the general reaction from the Centre, Source said that much to his surprise the response was one of disinterest in the technology, combined with suspicion that the information was "plant". At the same time, he was advised that for this reason he should be careful. He added that the Centre was surprised, and unwilling to accept, that a technologically advanced country like the UK could be using such relatively old technology, and had designed such equipment to operate in an old-fashioned frequency band. He could not at the time understand the lack of interest, but inferred during the interview that it was possible that the response was from the foreign technology department of the KGB (Directorate T) alone and judged only from a technology standpoint. He agreed that similar information could have been known already to the Centre and ECM systems already designed to counter them, or that current Soviet policy at the time could have been to take out strategic airfields before they could be used - he did not know. Either of these were possible additional reasons for the disinterest. He added that MOD operational staffs or technical experts from the Design Bureaux were generally not consulted by the KGB at this stage unless it was absolutely necessary. However he was surprised to learn later that the material he provided was subsequently shown to ANDROPOV at KGB Headquarters; it must therefore have been considered important from a technical, military, or intelligence standpoint, or all three. When asked whether he would have known if a decision had been taken by the VPK (Military Industrial Commission) that a countermeasure system should be introduced, he said that this would not have been divulged to him. However he commented that it was the specific remit of the VPK to consider what Soviet action should be taken to counter a Western weapon system whenever new information on such systems came into their hands.

11 SEP 2003

11374

Conclusions

5. Source could provide nothing positive to indicate whether the then Soviet Union had introduced new ECM equipment or had modified existing equipment in order to counter XN715. However this was to be expected, because of the importance and the correspondingly tight security which the Soviets attached to Electronic Warfare. On the other hand, he has provided independent confirmation that in spite of the puzzling lack of feedback he received personally, the Soviets clearly regarded the acquisition of this material as sufficiently important to show it to ANDROPOV, and to exploit it in the design of their own equipment. It appears certain that with such a clearly defined threat the VPK would at the time also have carefully considered the military, operational and weapon system implications of this new intelligence, and what operational or technical counter to XN715 should be introduced.

